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Abstract:  
This paper provides a primer on European multinational business groups and 
their subsidiaries. Firms in these business groups appear to have higher 
sales performance than firms in domestic groups (15% higher). This leads us 
to investigate which elements increase the likelihood that a group will 
transition towards multinational status. Business groups’ characteristics 
matter for foreign acquisition: groups becoming multinational are usually 
larger, have a more hierarchical structure with respect to the number of 
layers in a group, and are more diverse in terms of sectors. Groups tend to 
expand into bordering countries or countries providing particular advantages, 
such as a large internal market. The first acquisition is a corporate-level 
decision that appears to be made by the group’s controlling firm and is often 
a diversification into a different industry. 
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1 Introduction  
 
In recent years, researchers in both economics and finance have 
focused on business groups (BGs, hereafter). In this paper, we look at 
European business groups across seven years (2001 through 2007) and 
study the characteristics of multinational and domestic-only business groups. 
First, we show how the sales performance of firms belonging to multinational 
groups compares to that of domestic-only groups; second, we look at which 
characteristics of business groups make them more likely to transition from a 
domestic group towards a multinational status; and, finally, we look at 
patterns of first foreign acquisition and try to shed light on possible factors 
that can influence groups going multinational.  
As this paper looks at business groups (BGs), a formal definition is 
provided. A business group (a.k.a a “corporate group”) is defined as a group 
consisting of two or more legally independent firms operating in multiple and 
often distinct markets, in which affiliates are under the control of one ultimate 
owner at the top of the pyramid. Pyramid structures are built through a series 
of chains of equity ties from the headquarters to all its subsidiaries (La Porta 
et al, 1999; Almeida and Wolfensohn, 2006), in which the ultimate owner 
owns the subsidiary either directly—i.e., with direct ownership of its 
subsidiary—or indirectly—i.e., with an ownership stake through one or more 
intermediate firms. Being a part of a business group allows interaction among 
the affiliates, while allowing them to keep their independent status to make 
final decisions and access markets. It is this latter property that distinguishes 
business groups from multidivisional markets and standalones.  The smallest 
business group is composed of two firms, with one affiliate and one 
headquarters.  Multinational business groups have at least one firm from a 
different country than the ultimate holder.  
 Studies have highlighted the importance of business groups in a 
number of ways. First, studies dating back as early as the 1980s have shown 
that group-affiliated firms are more profitable than standalone companies. 
Chang and Choi (1998) showed that the performance of group-affiliated firms 
was more profitable than standalone firms in South Korea; other studies have 
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shown that business groups are able to offset imperfect institutions and 
missing markets (Caves, 1989; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Khanna and 
Rivkin, 2001; Carney et al., 2011; Mahmood and Mitchell, 2004). Groups also 
have shown to be effective in sharing management talent and informational 
flows (Khanna and Palepu, 1997) and in redistributing the financial resources 
that benefit groups-affiliates’ innovative performance (Belonzon and 
Berkovitz, 2010). The correlation among business group structure, vertical 
integration and productivity has been analyzed by Altomonte and Rungi 
(2013). The management literature has focused primarily on within-firm 
structures, mainly in the context of managerial know-how, with firms modeled 
as hierarchical organizations of expertise (Garicano, 2000; Garicano and 
Rossi Hansberg, 2004, 2006, 2012; Garicano and Hubbard, 2007; Bloom, 
Sadun and Van Reenen (2012). 
While more and more studies have focused on how groups matter and 
why business groups exist, most of their analysis is limited to business group 
affiliate performance—that is, comparing standalone firms to group-affiliated 
firms. Little has been done to analyze various group structures—in particular, 
the differences between multinational and domestic groups. We know that 
multinational firms tend to do better and are stronger than national firms, but 
the differences between nationals and multinationals at the group level has 
not been explored to date, and it is this gap that we aim to fill.  
  We know that multinational enterprises (MNEs) have attracted 
increased attention in the economic literature over the past decade, being at 
the center of various fields, such as international trade, international finance, 
management and organizational economics. This is not surprising given the 
relevance of MNEs in the global economy. According to estimates by Unctad 
(2011), multinational firms represent 25% of global GDP and account for 
around one third of international trade. 
 It is well known that enterprises become multinational to gain access 
to larger markets, to secure cheaper input for production, and to gain access 
to knowledge. Studies have also shown that plants belonging to MNEs differ 
from non-MNE plants in both their characteristics and their performance. 
These plants tend to be larger and more innovative, to perform better, and to 
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pay higher wages. (Doms and Jensen, 1998; Crisculo, Haskel and Slaughter, 
2004).   
This difference in firm performance of national versus multinational 
ownership can be explained in a number of ways: first, if the acquiring foreign 
owner is more productive, we observe a positive spillover to subsidiaries; 
second, if the foreign firm comes from a technologically advanced country, 
the firm enables technology transfer to the subsidiary, hence allowing for 
better subsidiary performance (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; Benfratello and 
Sembenelli, 2006; Carluccio and Fally, 2010; Bloom, Sadun and Van 
Reenen, 2012). Studies such as Lipsey and Sjoholm (2002) and Girma and 
Holger (2007) also find a positive post-acquisition wage effect. All of these 
studies provide compelling evidence for the positive effects of foreign 
ownership on plant performance. The vital role that multinationals play leads 
us to ask: what propels business groups to become multinational?  
The contribution of this paper is to bridge the literature on Multinational 
Enterprises and that on Business Groups. As previously discussed, the 
benefits of belonging to an MNE have been identified: we know why firms 
chose to cross borders, and we have an understanding of the benefits of 
belonging to BGs. However, little is known about the dynamics of national 
and multinational business groups in terms of (i) their respective subsidiaries’ 
sales performance; (ii) the characteristics that lead a group to transition into a 
multinational status; and (iii) how these domestic groups start their first 
foreign acquisition in terms of: the countries they decide to enter; the level of 
the pyramid ownership structure at which the acquisition takes place (see 
Section 2, “Data,” for more details on the definition of pyramid ownership); 
and whether they decide to take advantage of comparative advantage by 
acquiring a firm in a different sector of their own.     
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
provides a detailed analysis of the data used in this paper and includes 
descriptive statistics on the period studied. In Section 3, we divide business 
groups into two categories, multinational and domestic groups, and look at 
differences at both the group level and the subsidiary level. Multinational 
groups are larger (in terms of number of firms in a group), more hierarchical 
(in terms of the verticality of the group, measured as the distance between 
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the headquarters and the furthest subsidiary in the ownership chain), and 
have greater sectoral diversity than national groups. Groups expand primarily 
in their home country and expand across countries only progressively. 
Subsidiaries belonging to multinational groups have higher employment, 
capital and sales than those in domestic-only groups. We conclude this 
section by running a simple OLS regression on subsidiary sales, controlling 
for group and firm characteristics and including fixed effects. We find that 
subsidiaries belonging to multinational business groups have a 15% higher 
sale premium and 12% higher value added than those in domestic groups. In 
Section 4, we first want to understand whether domestic groups become 
stronger once they gain multinational status (treatment effect) or whether the 
groups switching to multinational status had different characteristics to start 
with that allowed them to become multinational (selection effect); second we 
identify possible drivers to multinational status. We find that firms that belong 
to switching groups are larger in terms of employment and have higher sales 
and value added than those in always-domestic groups even before 
becoming multinational. Likewise, on a group level, switching groups have a 
different structure from always-domestic groups: they have more affiliates 
and higher sectoral diversity and are more hierarchical in terms of the 
number of layers in their group. This suggests a strong selection into 
becoming multinational. We conclude by using a linear probability model to 
assess which group characteristics are associated with a group transitioning 
into a multinational status.  We find that better-performing and more-capital- 
intense groups are more likely to become multinationals, and the probability 
of becoming a multinational also increases with the size of the group and with 
group hierarchy. Our last section, Section 5, analyzes how a domestic group 
becomes multinational by looking at the countries in which domestic groups 
first make their first foreign acquisition; the layer of the hierarchy at which 
they acquire the foreign subsidiary; and the sector in which the newly 
acquired foreign firm is active. We find evidence that (i) most groups acquire 
their first subsidiary in neighbouring regions or in regions that are legally and 
culturally similar; (ii) that a “corporate-level decision” is made when acquiring 
a foreign subsidiary, as the new affiliate comes in at the top layer of the 
group, close to headquarters; and (iii) that the first foreign subsidiary is 
6 
 
usually from a different sector than the overwhelming part of the group and 
from a different sector than the headquarters, suggesting that becoming a 
multinational is to take advantage of a new country’s comparative advantage.  
To carry out the analysis, we use the Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk) 
dataset, which provides detailed accounting and financial information on 
companies and includes ownership data between shareholders and their 
subsidiaries.1 Since Amadeus only contains information on direct ownership 
links, and not on the entire chain of ownership links, we use the “European 
Pyramid Ownership Structures” dataset created by Bena, Fons-Rosen and 
Hanousek (2009). By also establishing intermediate ownership links, the 
authors develop a dataset based on Amadeus that describes pyramid 
ownership structures of business groups (for more details on the construction 
of pyramid ownership, see Section 2 “Data”).  
 
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
2.1 Data  
 
This paper relies on the Amadeus dataset (Bureau Van Dijk), which provides 
in-depth annual reports on accounting information and private company 
information for approximately 8,000,000 firms from 35 countries in both 
Western and Eastern Europe.2  Bureau Van Dijk (BvD) gathers data from a 
number of sources, including company registration offices, national statistics 
offices and stock exchanges. Amadeus/Orbis also provides information on 
comprehensive ownership reporting, each firm’s shareholders and ownership 
stakes, and, in particular, each firm’s ultimate owner. From Amadeus, we use 
information on firms’ BvD unique identifier, employment, capital (tangible 
fixed assets) and turnover (sales). 
Although Amadeus has detailed data on direct ownership links, it does 
not offer an entire chain of ownership links (direct and indirect) for business 
groups and, therefore, fails to provide information on business group 
structures.  Hence, we supplement Amadeus data with the “European 
Pyramid Ownership Structures” dataset developed by Bena, Fons-Rosen, 
                                                 
1
 https://amadeus.bvdinfo.com/ 
2
 https://amadeus.bvdinfo.com/ 
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and Hanousek (2009). This dataset provides pyramid ownership structures of 
business groups based on direct ownership links from Amadeus.3 To 
construct an annual panel of ownership data, Bena et al. put together 
multiple issues of Amadeus DVDs, to construct a pyramid ownership dataset. 
They use seven Amadeus DVD updates, each including cross-sectional 
ownership data spanning from 2001 to 2007. The authors construct an 
algorithm that uses direct ownership links of Amadeus firms to create a 
database that describes pyramid ownership structures by providing 
intermediate ownership stakes, where ownership is defined as cash- flow 
rights. The algorithm works backwards: it begins by taking a firm that does 
not own any other firm (hence does not have ownership of any subsidiary) 
and then, based on the ownership relation provided by Amadeus, finds the 
holders of this firm. The process is repeated until the ultimate owner is 
reached (the highest on the pyramid, which has no other holder). With this 
recursive method, several other variables can be constructed: the indirect 
ownership percentage; the direct ownership percentage; and the aggregate 
ownership of the ultimate owner in the subsidiary.4 Further variables 
constructed by the authors are the number of steps it takes from the 
subsidiary to the ultimate owner (by counting the links of intermediate 
owners); the minimum layer at which the subsidiary is present in the group; 
the maximum layer at which the subsidiary is present. From these statistics, 
we construct our own business conglomerate measures: total levels (layers) 
of the business group; the number of affiliates in a group (business group 
size); and the number of affiliates on a given layer. These variables will aid 
us to understand the pyramidal structure of the group—that is, the group 
hierarchy (verticality) in terms of the number of layers in a group and the level 
on which the affiliates are present.  
 
                                                 
3
 Data were kindly provided by the authors of the dataset. 
4
To illustrate, suppose that firm A (the headquarters) has a direct ownership share of 26% in firm C 
(subsidiary 1) and has a direct ownership share of 81% in firm B (subsidiary 2). Furthermore, if firm 
B has a direct ownership share of 52% in firm C, then the aggregate ownership of firm A in firm C 
would be the sum of what A directly owns in C and what it indirectly owns in C (through B). Hence, 
Direct: [(26 %  ownership of A in C)] + Indirect: [(81%  ownership of A over B) *  (*52%) ownership 
of B over C)  = Aggregate ownership of A in C : [26 % direct + (81% *52%) indirect]= 68% .  
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2.2 Sample Construction  
 
The original panel of pyramid business groups across seven years contains 
over 10,000,000 firm-year observations. To arrive at our final sample, we 
consider the following restrictions: (1) In the sample of business groups, to 
ensure clear interpretation of control, we impose a 50.01% aggregate 
ownership cut-off. Aggregate ownership is the percentage share that the 
ultimate holder has in the subsidiary both directly and indirectly. Therefore, 
this implies that although the ultimate owner may not formally directly control 
the subsidiary, as long as its aggregate ownership exceeds 50.01%, the 
ultimate owner qualifies as controlling the subsidiary. Imposing the aggregate 
ownership cut-off leads to 3,520,000 observations. (2) A business group or a 
subsidiary must be present for at least two years; therefore, those 
subsidiaries (and ultimate owners) that are present in only one year are 
dropped. (3) We also drop firms owned by individuals (resulting in 2,100,000 
observations). (4) The number of employees, the tangible fixed assets (EUR 
mil) and the sales (EUR mil) of a firm are variables used in our regressions. 
Hence, the requirement that all variables be present for the analysis 
substantially reduces the final sample, as only 16% of our observations have 
all of these variables present, leaving us with 339,822 observations. (5) In 
addition, we drop business groups for which the headquarters’ industry 
(NACE 4) is not known. (6) For our analysis, we exclude business groups 
that gain and lose multinational status in the sample, as such dynamics 
would require a relatively high degree of activity in terms of acquisition and 
dismissal of subsidiaries. This could be due, in large part, to misreporting 
(when considering such a limited time frame). This reduces the sample by 
2%. (7) Moreover, as the focus of the paper is how business groups become 
multinational, we do not consider BGs that lost their multinational status (an 
additional 0.07% of the sample is dropped). Therefore, we are left with a total 
of 268,781 observations as the final sample. These observations belong to 
74,213 subsidiaries and 47,948 ultimate holders (BG’s).5 
                                                 
5
Each subsidiary belongs to one ultimate owner for two reasons: i) the ultimate owner must own at 
least 50.01% of the subsidiary; therefore, each subsidiary can belong to only one ultimate owner in a 
given year; and ii) the handful of subsidiaries where the subsidiary switched ultimate owners across 
the years is dropped to make the analysis as clean as possible. 
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2.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 
In this section, we provide some descriptive statistics on the final sample. 
The panel for our analysis ranges from 2001 to 2007 ( Table 1). The number 
of business groups in our sample increases with time; however, in 2007, our 
sample drops due to the truncated version of the last available year in the 
pyramid dataset provided by Bena et al. (2009). The panel contains 180,772 
observations for business groups at the year level, for a total of 47,948 
unique business groups. In terms of subsidiaries present in the panel, there 
are 268,731 observations that correspond to 74,213 unique subsidiaries. 
Table 1. Number of Observations per Year 
Panel A: 
# of Business Groups 
year panel Freq Percent 
2001 12319 7% 
2002 19005 11% 
2003 26184 14% 
2004 31219 17% 
2005 37686 21% 
2006 36077 20% 
2007 18282 10% 
Total  180772   
No. of BG 47948   
      
Panel B  
# of Subsidiaries 
year panel Freq Percent 
2001 18456 7% 
2002 29792 11% 
2003 38464 14% 
2004 46367 17% 
2005 56462 21% 
2006 53044 20% 
2007 24442 9% 
Total 268731   
No. of sub 74213   
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Note: The table shows the number of observations per year. Panel A shows the number of 
business groups present each year. Total refers to the number of business groups in our   
panel, and No. of BG is the unique number of business group in our panel. Panel B shows 
the number of subsidiaries present each year.  Total is the number of subsidiaries, and No. 
of sub is the unique number of subsidiaries in our panel.  The data come from the Amadeus 
dataset (Bureau Van Dijk) for years 2001-2007. The sample is restricted to business groups 
and subsidiaries in which (i) the ultimate holders and subsidiaries were present for at least 
two years; (ii) the aggregate ownership of the ultimate holder in the subsidiary exceeds 
50.01%; and (iii) the information on the number of employees, tangible fixed assets and 
sales are available for the firm. 
 
Denmark appears to have the largest business groups, and this 
seems to be related to the presence of few very large groups at the top of the 
distribution. Portugal and Switzerland also have large business groups, but in 
their case, the distribution seems entirely shifted towards larger BGs, as 
suggested by a median business group size that is almost twice as large than 
those of the other countries. The average size of a business group in our 
total sample (represented by all 34 countries) is 3.37.  
Table 2 provides information on business group size (number of firms 
in a group) by country, where the country refers to the headquarters' location. 
The sample comprises 34 countries, but for ease of presentation, the table 
reports the first 20 countries in terms of the highest concentration of business 
groups (47,682 business groups, which account for 98% of business groups 
in our total sample).  We then give statistics on the 50th and 90th percentiles, 
the maximum number of firms in the business group and the total number of 
business groups by country of origin (ultimate holder’s country). Finally, our 
last column reports the share of total business groups in the sample with 
headquarters originating in the given country. As the table reveals, a large 
share of our business groups (75.5%) have headquarters in France, Sweden 
and Spain. The second column tells us the mean of business group size in 
terms of the number of subsidiaries for each country. In terms of mean size, 
we cannot conclude that Southern European or Northern European countries 
have a larger number of firms within their business groups. Denmark appears 
to have the largest business groups, and this seems to be related to the 
presence of few very large groups at the top of the distribution. Portugal and 
Switzerland also have large business groups, but in their case, the 
distribution seems entirely shifted towards larger BGs, as suggested by a 
median business group size that is almost twice as large than those of the 
other countries. The average size of a business group in our total sample 
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(represented by all 34 countries) is 3.37.  
Table 2. Average business group size by country (based on Ultimate Holder’s 
country) 
 BG Size  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Top 20 Countries  mean p50 p99 max  #BG % of BG  
France 3.02 2 14 187 18838 39.0%  
Sweden 2.98 2 14 157 11329 23.4%  
Spain 3.26 2 15 134 6345 13.1%  
Germany 3.50 2 15 43 2059 4.3%  
Italy 5.46 3 36 142 2005 4.1%  
Belgium 4.19 3 21 74 1752 3.6%  
Finland 3.14 2 13 100 1505 3.1%  
Netherlands 5.56 3 36 237 1021 2.1%  
Greece 2.60 2 7 30 445 0.9%  
Bulgaria 6.00 2 121 232 392 0.8%  
Poland 2.76 2 10 33 316 0.7%  
Estonia 2.36 2 5 8 310 0.6%  
Switzerland 6.82 4 49 87 296 0.6%  
Denmark 11.60 3 185 274 177 0.4%  
United Kingdom 2.69 2 11 13 172 0.4%  
Austia 2.60 2 10 14 172 0.4%  
Croatia 4.93 3 26 59 161 0.3%  
Romania 4.48 3 30 72 157 0.3%  
Portugal 9.62 5 84 127 143 0.3%  
Czech Republic 2.74 2 21 21 97 0.2%  
        
Total (34 countries) 3.37 2 18 331 47948 100.0%  
 
Note: Column (1) shows the mean number of subsidiaries in a business group by county of 
origin (defined by the country of ultimate holder). Column (2) reports the 50th percentile, 
column (3) the 90th, column (4) the maximum number of firms in the business group, and 
column (5) the total number of business groups in the respective country. Finally, column (6) 
reports the share of total business groups in the sample with headquarters originating from 
the given country. The source, data and sample used are the same as described in Table 1.  
There are a total of 34 countries in our sample, of which, for ease of presentation, the table 
reports the first 20 countries in terms of the highest concentration of business groups 
(47,692 business groups which account for 98% of all business groups). Total represents the 
statistics for all our 34 countries in our sample (47948 business groups). 
 
Table 3 reports the size of the groups (number of firms in a group) for 
the pooled sample. There is a large difference in the number of firms per 
group: the majority (63%) of our sample is represented by small groups, 
composed of two firms (an ultimate holder and its affiliate); 26% are 
composed of three or four firm groups, while the remaining categories make 
up the remaining 11% of our business groups.   
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Table 3. Size Category for all Business Groups. 
# Affiliates  No. of BG % 
1   30273   63% 
2-3   12337   26% 
4-5   2875   6% 
6-20   2263   5% 
21-50   156   0% 
51-200   43   0% 
201-500   1   0% 
Total    47948     
 
Note: The table reflects the size distribution of business groups in our sample. Size is 
represented in categories by the number of subsidiaries in a group ( # of Affiliates).  No. of 
BG shows the total number of business groups by size category. % shows the share of 
business groups found in the respective size category. The source, data and sample used 
are the same as described in Table 1. 
 
Differences in business group size are reflected, in part, by the degree 
of hierarchy in the pyramid of groups defined as the number of layers, which 
is described in Table 4 (for definition of layers, turn to the beginning of this 
section).  The majority of our groups have one layer (all subsidiaries being 
directly under the headquarters). However, even if the group is composed of 
more firms, subsidiaries seem to be concentrated at the first or second level, 
as the share of groups with only one layer is larger than the share of groups 
with only one subsidiary. This suggests that, generally, the group’s expansion 
is a centralized decision, and only for very large groups do subsidiaries play 
an active part in its expansion.   
 
Table 4. Group Distribution by Hierarchy in the Pyramid 
Total 
Layers 
# BGs % 
1 39128 82% 
2 6736 14% 
3 1407 3% 
4 404 1% 
(5-10) 265 1% 
>10 8 0% 
Total 47948 100% 
 
Note: Total Layers reflects the degree of hierarchy of the business group. 1 layer defines a 
flat business group, where the subsidiaries are directly under the ultimate holder (1 distance 
away). 2 and more layers imply that there are subsidiaries that are not directly below the 
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ultimate holder—that is, they are at least 2 distances away from the ultimate holder, with 
subsidiaries found between the ultimate holder and the respective subsidiary. # BGs are the 
number of groups by category of hierarchy. % represents the share of the total business 
groups in the sample belonging to the respective category. Source, data and sample used 
are as described in Table 1. 
   
Lastly, we look at the industry diversity of groups. For a sector 
diversity group measure, the affiliates’ 4-digit NACE is taken to construct a 
diversity index using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI).6 As we are 
interested in the sectoral diversity of the group, the 1-HHI index is taken. In 
general, sector diversification increases with the number of firms in the group 
(apart from the last category—however, this statistic is based on few 
observations). As Table 5 shows, the larger groups have more scope for 
diversifying their activities and might be willing to engage in vertical 
integration, thus including in the group suppliers that might belong to different 
sectors.  
Table 5. Group Level Sectoral Diversity 
Sectoral Diversity (NACE4) by No of 
Affiliates in a  BG 
#Affiliates Sectoral Diversity 
1-5 0.04 
6-20 0.23 
21-50 0.27 
51-200 0.37 
Total Average 0.05 
Note: # Affiliates reflects the number of firms in a business group. Sectoral Diversity is 
calculated as the average number of sectors that the business groups are active in by 
country of headquarters. Sectors are defined at the NACE 4 level. Source and sample are 
constructed as described in Table 3. 
 
3   Multinational Groups vs Domestic Groups  
 
We further our analysis of business groups by looking at the differences in 
the characteristics of multinational and non-multinational groups. The first 
part of this section provides details on the sample composition in terms of 
group categories (never multinational, always multinational) and presents 
                                                 
6
 HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, which is measured as the sectoral concentration (based on 
4-digit NACE) in a business group. This is calculated by taking the sum of the sectoral shares squared 
in a business group. Given that we subtract HHI, concentration index, from 1, a diversity index is 
created.  
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descriptive statistics regarding the characteristics of these groups and of their 
respective subsidiaries. The second part focuses on the sales performance 
premium of firms in multinational groups accounting for differences in 
observables. This allows us to isolate the pure multinational effect from 
compositional changes; for example, firms in multinational groups might be 
larger to begin with, and, hence, a pure sales comparison between the two 
categories would not be appropriate. 
 
 
3.1 Multinational vs Domestic Group Characteristics 
 
We introduce simple summary statistics of our multinational and national 
groups in our sample. Table 6 gives brief summary statistics of the 
percentage of domestic versus multinational groups by country of origin 
(defined as the country where headquarters are located). In our sample, the 
countries with the highest share of multinational groups are Germany, Italy, 
Belgium, and the Netherlands. While Denmark and Portugal have only 
multinational groups, these countries represent just a small fraction of our 
business groups. Business groups with headquarters in Bulgaria, the United 
Kingdom and Austria are almost all domestic, but, again, these countries 
represent only a small proportion of our business groups—probably due to 
the limitation of accounting and financial information.  Most of the business 
groups in France, Sweden and Spain are also domestic; however, given the 
high share of groups that they represent, even the small share of 
multinational groups amounts to a sizable number of the total multinational 
groups in our sample.  
Table 6. Total No. of Domestic and Multinational groups by country 
 
No. of Business Groups by Country of HQ 
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
Top 20 countries   Total Groups   Non-MN   Share   MN   Share  
France   18838   18590   99%   248   1% 
Sweden   11329   10743   95%   586   5% 
Spain   6345   6231   98%   114   2% 
Germany   2059   1608   78%   451   22% 
Italy   2005   1423   71%   582   29% 
Belgium   1752   1312   75%   440   25% 
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Finland   1505   1429   95%   76   5% 
Netherlands 1021   554   54%   467   46% 
Greece   445   435   98%   10   2% 
Bulgaria   392   392   100%         
Poland   316   308   97%   8   3% 
Estonia   310   293   95%   17   5% 
Switzerland 296   9   3%   287   97% 
Denmark   177           177   100% 
United Kingdom 172   170   99%   2   1% 
Austria   172   171   99%   1   1% 
Croatia   161   95   59%   66   41% 
Romania   157   138   88%   19   12% 
Portugal   143           143   100% 
Czech Republic 97   87   90%   10   10% 
                      
Total (34 countries)   47692   43988   92.23%   3704   8% 
 
Note: Column (1) shows the total number of groups by country. Of these, Column (2) Non-
MN reports the number of groups that are domestic by country, and column (4) MN reports 
the total number of groups that are multinational. Columns (3) and (5) report the shares of 
domestic versus multinational groups by country. There are a total of 34 countries in our 
sample, of which, for ease of presentation, the table reports the first 20 countries in terms of 
the highest concentration of business groups (47,692 business groups, which account for 
98% of all business groups). Total represents the statistics for all 34 countries in our sample 
(47,948 business groups). The data come from the Amadeus dataset (Bureau Van Dijk) for 
years 2001-2007. The sample is restricted to business groups and subsidiaries in which (i) 
the ultimate holders and subsidiaries were present for at least two years; (ii) aggregate 
ownership of the ultimate holder in the subsidiary exceeds 50.01%; and (iii) information on 
the number of employees, tangible fixed assets and sales are available for the firm. 
 
It is important to note that the size of the business groups (number of 
firms in a group) is consistently larger when groups are multinational as 
opposed to domestic, irrespective of the country considered (Table 7).  
Moreover, looking at the 99th percentile, respectively, we see that the largest 
multinational groups are substantially larger than their domestic counterparts 
for each country in our sample.   
Table 7. Business Size Category by Country of HQ 
BG Size: # of Affiliates in a Group 
Country of HQ  
 (top 20 by BG 
concentration) 
Domestic Multinational   
(1) (2) (3) (4)   
Mean Size  99th  Mean Size  99th    
France 2.7 10 9.8 81   
Sweden 2.6 9 7.4 60   
Spain 2.9 11 6.1 38   
Germany 2.8 11 3.5 12   
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Italy 4.2 21 5.8 43   
Belgium 3.5 14 5.3 30   
Finland 2.8 10 4.7 43   
Netherlands 3.5 17 6.5 48   
Greece 2.4 7 3.9 8   
Bulgaria 5.1 83       
Poland 2.5 7 4.4 10   
Estonia 2.2 5 2.3 5   
Switzerland 3.6 12 5.5 30   
Denmark     9.7 185   
United Kingdom 2.5 10 4.5 5   
Austria 2.5 10 2.0 2   
Croatia 3.4 18 5.1 21   
Romania 3.3 15 9.5 72   
Portugal     8.3 63   
Czech Republic 2.4 8 4.4 21   
            
Total (34 countries) 2.8 11 6.2 48   
Note: Column (1) represents the average number of subsidiaries per group for domestic 
groups, and column (2) represents the 99th percentile broken down by country of 
headquarters. Similarly, for multinational groups, columns (3) and (4) represent the average 
number of subsidiaries per group and the 99th percentile, respectively, by country of 
headquarters.  Source, data and sample used are as described in the Note of Table 6. 
 
Difference in size is also related to differences in other dimensions, 
such as the hierarchy in the pyramid structure of the group and sectoral 
diversification. Table 8 shows that groups that are cross-national also have a 
higher level of sectoral diversity—that is, their subsidiaries belong to more 
sectors. Similarly, multinational groups are more hierarchical and span more 
layers (subsidiaries can be farther from their) than their national counterparts 
within each country. With the systematic differences between multinational 
and domestic groups across countries, we can safely claim that these 
differences are not country-specific.  
Table 8. Sectoral Diversity (mean), # of Layers (mean) of BGs by Country of HQ. 
 
    (1)   (2)     (3) 
    Sector(NACE 4)   # Layers     #Cntry 
Country of HQ    Non-MN   MN   Non-MN   MN     MN 
France   1.2   2.0   1.0   1.3     1.3 
Sweden   1.1   1.6   1.0   1.2     1.2 
Spain   1.2   1.9   1.0   1.2     1.2 
Germany   1.1   1.2   1.1   1.3     1.1 
Italy   1.2   1.3   1.0   1.1     1.2 
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Belgium   1.3   1.4   1.1   1.2     1.2 
Finland   1.2   1.6   1.0   1.1     1.3 
Netherlands   1.1   1.3   1.2   1.3     1.2 
Greece   1.1   1.2   1.0   1.0     1.0 
Bulgaria   1.3       1.0           
Poland   1.1   1.0   1.0   1.3     1.0 
Estonia   1.1   1.1   1.0   1.1     1.1 
Switzerland   1.1   1.2   1.0   1.2     1.2 
Denmark       1.2       1.7     1.3 
United 
Kingdom   
    1.1       1.4     1.0 
Austria   1.1   1.2   1.1   1.3     1.1 
Croatia   1.1   2.0   1.0   1.5     1.0 
Romania   1.1   1.0   1.0   1.0     1.0 
Portugal   1.1   1.4   1.0   1.3     1.1 
Czech 
Republic   
1.1   1.6   1.0   1.1     1.1 
                        
Total (34 
countries)   
1.1   1.4   1.0   1.2     1.2 
Note: The table reflects the diversity characteristics for domestic (Non-MN) and multinational 
(MN) groups by country of headquarters. Domestic groups are those in which all firms 
belonging to a group are from the ultimate holder’s country, while multinational groups are 
those in which at least one firm comes from a different country than the ultimate holder. 
Column (1) shows the average sectoral diversity of firms belonging to domestic and 
multinational business groups by country of headquarters, where sector is at the NACE 4 
level. Column (2) reflects the average number of layers business groups have, and column 
(3) shows the average number of countries present in groups by country of headquarters. 
Source, data and sample used are as described in the Note of Table 6. 
 
Multinational groups expand across countries progressively and select 
countries according to expected cost of entry and potential benefit. On the 
one hand, multinational groups could expand first into neighbouring 
countries, as this kind of expansion probably involves lower transaction 
costs. On the other hand, a group might be willing to face higher costs in the 
presence of higher expected revenues. Countries with especially larger 
markets, for example, might be more attractive to groups eager to get direct 
access to consumers. In order to shed light on this aspect, it is worth 
explicitly examining the country composition of subsidiaries. This is done in 
Table 9, which reports the mean number of subsidiaries for each country. As 
seen on the diagonal of the table, as expected, in all the countries, business 
groups tend to expand in their home country primarily. This appears 
reasonable, as a group would tend to consolidate its structure in its home 
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country, where transaction costs are lowest, before moving into different 
countries.  
 
Table 9. BG’s country presence 
 
 
Note: The table reflects the expansion of groups by country of headquarters (HQ) to 
countries of subsidiaries (sub). The table shows the average number of subsidiaries for each 
country given the ultimate holder’s country.  The table reports the first 20 countries in terms 
of the highest concentration of business groups (47,692 observations which account for 98% 
of all business groups in our sample). The data come from the Amadeus dataset (Bureau 
Van Dijk) for years 2001-2007. 
 
Previous steps have shown that multinational groups tend, at the 
aggregate level, to be different from domestic groups along several 
dimensions. Our analysis, however, has neglected possible differences at the 
subsidiary level. Firms belonging to multinational business groups could be 
larger and more profitable, thus allowing the headquarters to face the cost of 
making the group multinational. We address this question in Table 10, which 
compares affiliate-level size and profitability measures across our groups of 
firms by country of headquarters’ origin. More specifically, we look at whether 
subsidiaries belonging to multinational groups are, on average, statistically 
different in terms of employment, capital and sales to subsidiaries in national 
groups. For each characteristic, the first two columns report averages for 
               Sub
 HQ AT BE BG CH CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR IT NL PL PT RO SE
Austria AT 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.3
Belgium BE 0.1 1.5 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.1 0.5 0.3
Bulgaria BG 2
Switzerland CH 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 1
Czech Rep. CZ 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5
Germany DE 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 1.6 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.7
Denmark DK 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.7 0.8
Estonia EE 1.2 0.3
Spain ES 0.1 0.1 1.7 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1
Finland FI 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.1 1.5 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.5
France FR 0.2 0.1 0.7 1.6 0.3 0.1
UK GB 0.6 0.9 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.1
Greece GR 0.2 1.4 0.9
Croatia HR 1.4
Italy IT 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.4 1.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.5
Netherlands NL 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.2
Poland PL 0.3 1.3
Portugal PT 0.8 0.4 0.1 1.3
Romania RO 1.7
Sweden SE 0.2 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.2 1.3
Mean number of subsidiary firms per country of HQ 
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firms, whereas the last column for each set of firm characteristics reports the 
p-values for the differences in averages.  Subsidiaries of multinational groups 
are larger in terms of both capital and employment. They also have higher 
sales, which suggests a possible higher profitability; however, this could be 
related to differences in the other observables or to the group structure. We 
address this concern more formally in the next section in a regression 
framework. 
 
  
Table 10. Subsidiary Differences by Non-MN and MN Groups by Country of HQ 
 
Note: Table shows whether subsidiaries belonging to multinational groups are, on average, 
statistically different to subsidiaries in national groups. Variables tested are employment, 
Country of HQ Domestic Multinational p-val Domestic Multinational p-val Domestic Multinational p-val
France 44.0 192.0 0 0.6 7.9 0 7.0 35.4 0
[6.16] [29.83] [.03] [3.8] [.23] [4.84]
Sweden 16.2 98.5 0 2.1 4.9 0 3.3 26.7 0
[.48] [9.81] [.23] [1.1] [.11] [2.78]
Spain 46.0 292.6 0 2.2 15.2 0 8.5 92.3 0
[3.17] [71.79] [.16] [5.14] [.67] [21.18]
Germany 121.2 191.1 0 5.5 6.1 0 25.8 41.7 0
[5.99] [25.93] [.79] [1.02] [1.83] [6.13]
Italy 104.0 103.0 0 7.8 5.8 0 30.9 27.5 0
[6.63] [14.08] [2.17] [.95] [1.76] [3.58]
Belgium 61.4 83.5 0 2.6 3.2 0 17.4 27.3 0
[3.65] [16.14] [.22] [.61] [.9] [6.32]
Finland 37.8 142.9 0 2.0 3.8 0 8.0 28.1 0
[3.27] [33.15] [.48] [.95] [.86] [6.4]
Netherlands 69.2 198.8 0 2.7 10.0 0 20.0 57.1 0
[5.44] [32.43] [.7] [1.59] [1.7] [8.95]
Greece 60.0 80.6 0 3.5 3.7 0 6.1 14.4 0
[12.71] [44.96] [.71] [2.63] [.57] [6.79]
Bulgaria 133.9 . 0 1.7 . 0 3.3 . 0
[13.26] [.] [.3] [.] [.61] [.]
Poland 187.4 111.3 0 2.3 4.5 0 12.2 14.7 0
[26.36] [40.43] [.33] [3.09] [1.97] [7.61]
Estonia 71.1 34.4 0 2.1 0.5 0 5.3 5.2 0
[13.31] [8.45] [1.16] [.16] [.9] [1.12]
Switzerland 128.8 127.5 0 37.6 4.6 0 34.3 29.7 0
[53.43] [16.43] [18.5] [.76] [15.48] [3.55]
Denmark 55.0 0 2.2 0 15.4 0
[7.94] [.55] [.] [2.02]
United Kingdom . 84.3 0 . 3.3 0 . 34.3 0
[.] [13.55] [.] [.78] [.] [11.99]
Austria 218.3 160.2 0 18.5 8.4 0 46.3 31.9 0
[39.68] [37.09] [7.74] [3.4] [7.97] [5.48]
Croatia 191.1 528.0 0 16.1 63.0 0 12.4 46.0 0
[53.65] [197.55] [8.20] [38.72] [3.1] [23.23]
Romania 92.7 83.0 0 0.7 0.5 0 1.1 1.9 0
[22.37] [.] [.22] [.] [.28] [.]
Portugal 208.6 627.1 0 4.4 57.2 0 11.9 92.5 0
[31.73] [294.94] [1.1] [33.24] [1.7] [43.18]
Czech Republic 208.6 627.1 0 4.4 57.2 0 11.9 92.5 0
[310.85] [1251.33] [10.81] [141.03] [16.7] [183.21]
Employment Sales Capital 
Subsidiary Characteristics belonging to  Domestic and Multinational Groups
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capital and sales. For each characteristic, the first two columns report averages for firms, 
whereas the last column for each set of firm characteristics reports the p-values for the 
differences of average. The table reports these results for firms belonging to the first 20 
countries in terms of the highest concentration of business groups. The data come from the 
Amadeus dataset (Bureau Van Dijk) for years 2001-2007. 
 
 
 
3.2 Subsidiary sales performance in Multinational versus 
Non-Multinational groups. 
 
Our first empirical strategy focuses on understanding whether a sales 
premium of subsidiaries in multinational groups, as opposed to those in 
domestic-only  groups, is due to differences in group characteristics. We 
control for different organizational characteristics that we previously found for 
multinational and domestic groups (hierarchy, size and sectoral diversity of 
groups). We compare subsidiaries that belong to multinational groups to 
subsidiaries in domestic-only groups. The first part of the analysis is based 
on a classical Cobb-Douglas production function. This specification describes 
the effect of belonging to a multinational group on subsidiary sales. 
lnYigt =
β0 + β1MNgt +  β2lnLigt + β3lnKigt + ∑ 𝛾j
𝑘
𝑗=1
Layergtj +
                ∑ 𝛼j
𝑘
𝑗=1
BG_sizegtj + β4DIV_Sectorgt + 𝜆t + εigt ,   
                                                                                       (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑔𝑡, measures the sales performance of subsidiary i belonging to 
business group g at time t, as in  Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012a). 
For estimating the production function, we use standard input variables: 𝐿𝑖𝑔𝑡 
and 𝐾𝑖𝑔𝑡, which are  labour and capital of subsidiary i. Our variable of interest 
is MNgt,  a dummy variable taking on value 1 if business group g is 
multinational at time t. Our coefficient of interest is β1. A positive coefficient of 
β1 would imply that being part of a multinational group is correlated with 
higher subsidiary sales. We control for different group characteristics found in 
the previous section for multinational and domestic-only groups. We control 
for hierarchy in the pyramid structure of a group by including a set of controls 
for the total number of layers in a group, Layergtk. These allow for a richer 
description of the effects of the hierarchy on sales performance, allowing for 
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a clearer identification of non-linearities such as those identified by Altomonte 
et al. (2013). Similarly, we control for the effects of the size of the group using 
a set of dummy variables identifying different size classes based on the 
number of firms in group g at time t, 𝐵𝐺_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑔𝑡𝑗.  As multinational groups are 
more likely to be large, we introduce the size control to avoid a biased 
multinational coefficient. 𝐷𝐼𝑉_𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑔𝑡, the diversity of the sector of the group 
(identified by NACE 2), is also included to control for the level of sectoral 
diversification within a group. The sectoral diversity of a group might be 
related to its degree of vertical integration or to its level of diversification, 
which can lead to a higher level of sales if sectors in the group are 
characterized by synergies. Furthermore, year fixed effects 𝜆t are included to 
control for common time shock.  Finally, εgt is a random noise error term at 
the group level at time t.  
We find that firms belonging to a multinational group have 15- 
percentage-point higher sales than those in non-multinational groups after 
controlling for firm characteristics, group characteristics and country/sector 
fixed effects.  
  The results in Table 11 show, on an affiliate level, the effect of being 
in a multinational group on subsidiary performance (log of subsidiary sales), 
accounting for different group characteristics.  Column (1) shows the cross-
sectional effect of belonging to a multinational group and finds that being in 
such a group is positively correlated with firm sales. Firms belonging to 
multinational business groups have about 36% higher sales than those in 
national groups (without the inclusion of fixed effects). Column (2) introduces 
year fixed effects to control for yearly shocks; headquarters sector fixed 
effects to ensure that it is not the headquarters’ industry characteristic that is 
driving the result; location fixed effects. The result still shows 19% higher 
sales for firms belonging to multinational groups. Column (3) includes fixed 
effects for country and sector composition and interactions between country 
and sector fixed effects to allow for a more flexible heterogeneity, still 
resulting in 15% higher sales for firms belonging to multinational groups. 
Although the multinational premium drops considerably (by approximately 
one half), it is still substantial and highly statistically significant. More 
hierarchical groups with more layers are also correlated with higher 
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subsidiary sales.   Finally, this result is confirmed using a more refined 
measure in column (4): firms in multinational business groups have 12% 
higher value added ceteris paribus. This is in line with the previous literature 
on multinationals, which points out the better performance of firms belonging 
to multinational enterprises (Doms and Jensen, 1998; Crisculo, Haskel and 
Slaughter, 2004).  
 
Table 11. Subsidiary sales and value added in Multinational Groups 
    Subsidiary sales and value added in a Multinational Group  
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Variables   Sales   Sales   Sales   Value Added 
                  
Multinational 0.359***   0.190***   0.147***   0.121*** 
    -0.035   -0.016   -0.014   -0.01 
Subsidiary L (log) 0.757***   0.775***   0.779***   0.757*** 
    -0.005   -0.005   -0.004   -0.003 
Subsidiary K (log) 0.135***   0.136***   0.134***   0.152*** 
    -0.003   -0.003   -0.003   -0.002 
Affiliates: 2-3 0.117***   0.061***   0.072***   0.031*** 
    -0.011   -0.009   -0.008   -0.006 
Affiliates: 4-5 0.137***   0.061***   0.092***   0.051*** 
    -0.018   -0.015   -0.013   -0.009 
Affiliates: 6-20 0.168***   0.093***   0.157***   0.088*** 
    -0.026   -0.022   -0.017   -0.013 
Affiliates: 21-50 0.106   0.100*   0.226***   0.178*** 
    -0.069   -0.054   -0.04   -0.029 
Affiliates: 51-200 -0.689**   -0.205   0.286***   0.251*** 
    -0.282   -0.182   -0.067   -0.049 
Affiliates: 200+ -2.060***   -0.357**   0.098   -0.077 
    -0.347   -0.159   -0.132   -0.116 
No. Layers 2 0.148***   0.130***   0.116***   0.115*** 
    -0.014   -0.011   -0.009   -0.007 
No. Layers 3 0.171***   0.179***   0.165***   0.200*** 
    -0.027   -0.022   -0.018   -0.013 
No. Layers 4 0.203***   0.219***   0.193***   0.206*** 
    -0.054   -0.039   -0.024   -0.02 
No. Layers 5 0.176*   0.229***   0.181***   0.256*** 
    -0.1   -0.066   -0.034   -0.028 
No. Layers 6 + 0.411***   0.339***   0.187***   0.275*** 
    -0.14   -0.097   -0.046   -0.038 
Industry Diversity -0.166***   -0.03   -0.042**   -0.012 
    -0.034   -0.026   -0.02   -0.015 
                  
Obervations 267,027   267,027   267,027   223,468 
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R-Squared 0.663   0.757   0.766   0.836 
Year FE   NO   YES   YES   YES 
Sector 
FE   NO   YES   YES   YES 
Country FE NO   YES   YES   YES 
Country Comp NO   NO   YES   YES 
Sector Comp NO   NO   YES   YES 
CountryXSector FE NO   NO   YES   YES 
 
Note: The statistical significance is as follows: * significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%, *** 
significant at 1%. The table shows on an affiliate level the effect of being in a multinational 
group on subsidiary performance (log of subsidiary sales), accounting for different group 
characteristics. Multinational is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if firm i belongs 
to a multinational group at time t. The dependent variable is (log of) subsidiary sales.  
(Subsidiary_L)  is the  log of the number of employees of the subsidiary; Log (Subsidiary_K)  
is the log of capital of the subsidiary; Affiliates, is the number of subsidiaries in a business 
group; No. of Layers is the number of layers of the business group; and Industry Diversity is 
an index measuring the diversity of the group based on NACE 4. Standard errors are 
clustered at the Headquarters level. 
 
 
4 Becoming a Multinational Group 
 
We previously showed that multinational groups have more industry diversity 
and are more hierarchical than national groups. Given the sales premium of 
subsidiaries in multinational groups, even after controlling for group 
characteristics, it is imperative to understand whether domestic groups 
become stronger after gaining their multinational status (treatment effect), or 
whether these switchers have different characteristics that allow them to 
become multinational (selection effect). We first examine whether switchers 
already look different from always-domestic groups before their first 
international move, and, second, we identify possible drivers to multinational 
status.  
 
4.1 Domestic Groups that make a foreign acquisition  
 
Until this point in our analysis, we have concentrated on two large groups: 
multinational and domestic. As Table 12, shows, domestic groups can be 
further divided into two groups: always-domestic (never change to 
multinational status) and those that went through a change by acquiring a 
foreign firm.  
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Panel A of Table 12 shows that 12% are always multinational, that the 
overwhelming majority, 86%, remain domestic and never switch, and 3% are 
domestic groups that switch status at some point.  One can draw a similar 
conclusion by looking at Panel B: throughout our entire study period, 17% 
belonged to groups that were multinational. Meanwhile, 80% of our firms 
belong to groups that remained domestic, while a small share of firms, 3%, 
belonged to groups that experienced a change in status.  
Table 12. Business Group Status 
 
Panel A  
# Business Group 
  Multinational    Domestic     
  Always   Never   Switchers   Total 
  3789   43237   922   47948 
  12%   86%   3%   100% 
Panel B 
# Subsidiary 
  Multinational    Domestic     
  Always   Never   Switchers   Total 
  8759   63555   1899   74213 
  17%   80%   3%   100% 
Note: Panel A shows the division of business groups, while Panel B shows the division of 
subsidiaries that are national versus domestic. Multinationals are those that have always 
been multinational throughout our sample, identified as Always. Domestic status is further 
divided into two groups: Never—that is, never changed to multinational status—and those 
that went through a switch by acquiring a foreign firm, identified as Switchers. These are 
constructed based on our 47,948 business groups that have, in total, 74,213 subsidiaries. 
The data comes from the Amadeus dataset (Bureau van Dijk) for years 2001-2007. 
 
 We now narrow our analysis to the two domestic groups: always-
domestic and those that were domestic and switched status. Table 13 shows 
a comparison of the subsidiary firms of switching groups and always- 
domestic groups, using a simple average comparison. The first two columns 
report averages for firm characteristics, while the last two columns report p-
values of t-test for differences in averages between the two categories: 
switchers and domestic groups (column 3). There appear to be important 
differences between domestic subsidiaries belonging to groups that will 
switch to a multinational status (these firms are still considered in their 
domestic state), and domestic subsidiaries that remain in national groups.  
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On average, firms in groups that switch employ more people than do firms in 
domestic groups. In addition, they also have higher productivity, as proxied 
by sales and value added per worker. This is consistent with models such as 
those of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), where access to a foreign market is 
related to a productivity threshold rule. By the same token, in this setting, 
groups may become multinational after the average productivity of its 
subsidiaries is sufficient to offset the costs of internationalization. Moreover, 
on a group level, switching groups are structurally different from always-
domestic groups: they have more affiliates in their group, have higher 
sectoral diversity and are more hierarchical in terms of the number of layers 
in a group.  
Table 13. Firm and Group Characteristics: Always-Domestic vs Switchers 
      (1)   (2)   (3) 
      Domestic   Switchers   p-value: 
Su
b
si
d
ia
ry
 -
Le
ve
l Subsidiary Sales/L   0.3   0.4   0.0 
Subsidiary L   44.9   119.1   0.0 
Subsidiary K/L   0.1   0.1   0.8 
Subsidiary Sales   7.7   27.9   0.0 
Subsidiary VA   2.1   7.1   0.0 
Subsidiary VA/L   0.1   0.1   0.0 
                
                
G
ro
u
p
- 
Le
ve
l Business Group 
Size   2.8   4.5   0.0 
Number of Sectors in 
BG 1.1   1.4   0.0 
Layers of BG 
(mean)   1.0   1.1   0.0 
                
 
Note: The table compares the subsidiary firms of always-domestic groups (Domestic) and 
switching groups (Switchers) in our sample, using a simple average comparison. Column (1) 
and column (2) report averages for firm characteristics for the two groups, respectively. The 
upper panel does the analysis at the subsidiary level, while the lower panel does it at the 
group level. Column (3) reports p-values (p-value) of the t-test for differences in averages 
between the two categories: switchers and domestic groups. Data are from the Amadeus 
(Bureau Van Dijk) dataset, 2001-2007, and the subsample considered is the one described 
in Table 12. However, only two types of business groups are considered from this 
subsample—those that become multinational and those that were never multinational 
(groups always having a multinational status in the study period are dropped). This leads to 
44,159 business groups, which have in total 65,454 subsidiaries. 
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 To evaluate which group characteristics are associated with a group 
transitioning into multinational status, we rely on equation (2). This 
specification aims to identify which business groups are more likely to 
become multinational. The two groups in our regression are those that are 
never multinational and those that become multinational. A linear probability 
model is used to assess the probability of the group becoming multinational 
given its characteristics. Our specification is: 
 
 
BecomeMNg =
β0 +  β1avglnLg + β2avglnK/Lg + β3avglSalesg +   ∑ 𝛾j
𝑘
𝑗=1
Layergj +
∑ 𝛼j
𝑘
𝑗=1
BG_sizegj + β4Industry Diversityg+𝜆t +   𝜙g + 𝜓g +    εg,                                                                                                    
(2) 
 
where the dependent variable, 𝐵𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑀𝑁𝑔, is a dummy variable taking on a 
value of one if business group g becomes a multinational at any point during 
our sample period. 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑔 is the average log employment of a subsidiary in 
business group g;  𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑙𝑛𝐾/𝐿𝑔 is the average log capital intensity of a 
subsidiary for group g, while 𝑎𝑣𝑔𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑔 is the average log of sales of a 
subsidiary for group g. Similar to specification (1), we include a set of 
dummies for the number of layers in the group, a set of business group size 
dummies, and a variable to control for the sectoral diversity of a group.  
Included also are controls, (i) 𝜆t for the year in which the group appears in the 
panel 7 to account for any year shocks; (ii) for the industry of the company 
headquarters, 𝜙g, as the headquarters’ sector can influence business 
strategies on how to expand the group, which, in turn, can be correlated with 
becoming a multinational; and (iii) headquarters county, 𝜓g, which allows us 
to control for the possibility of different patterns of internationalization 
according to country. We also include (iv) dummies for sector composition; 
and, finally, (v) interaction between country and sectors fixed effects to allow 
                                                 
7
 For this estimation, there is only one observation for each business group. We take the first year in 
which the BG is present in our panel. 
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for a certain degree of heterogeneity across countries. The results of 
equation (2) will allow us to describe which characteristics of a group seem to 
matter for its transition into a multinational group. 
Groups that become multinational are compared strictly with groups 
that are never multinational (always-multinational groups are excluded in this 
setting). On a group level, the results in Table 14 suggest that better- 
performing and more-capital-intense groups (proxied by the average log of 
sales and log of capital intensity for the subsidiaries in these groups) are 
more likely to become multinational: a one-percentage-point increase in 
average sales for subsidiaries in the group leads to a 0.008-percentage-point 
increase in the probability of becoming a multinational group (the magnitude 
of the effect is, however, small). The probability of becoming a multinational 
group increases with the size of the group (number of firms in a group), as 
well as with group hierarchy (measured as the number of layers in a group).  
These results clearly show that domestic groups in our sample that 
become switchers already look different than always-domestic groups prior to 
their first international acquisition; therefore, our findings suggest that there is 
a strong selection into becoming multinational.   
Table 14. Probability of Becoming a Multinational Group 
Dependant variable: Become a Multinational Group 
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Variables                 
Avg Subsidiary L (log)   0.003*   0.003*   0.002*   0.001 
    (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
Avg Subsidiary K/L (log)   0.002**   0.002**   0.001***   0.001*** 
    (0.001)   (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Avg Subsidiary Sale (log)   0.008***   0.008***   0.006***   0.007*** 
 
  (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.001)   (0.001) 
No. Layers 2   0.013**   0.013**   0.013***   0.012*** 
    (0.005)   (0.005)   (0.004)   (0.004) 
No. Layers 3   0.040***   0.041***   0.037***   0.036*** 
    (0.011)   (0.012)   (0.011)   (0.011) 
No. Layers 4   0.044***   0.044***   0.044***   0.048*** 
    (0.013)   (0.013)   (0.013)   (0.014) 
No. Layers 5   0.066   0.066   0.061   0.058 
    (0.039)   (0.040)   (0.041)   (0.043) 
No. Layers 6 +   0.080   0.080   0.087   0.075 
    (0.061)   (0.059)   (0.059)   (0.056) 
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Affiliates: 2-3   0.007***   0.008***   0.005***   0.005*** 
    (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.002)   (0.001) 
Affiliates: 4-5   0.016**   0.017**   0.011*   0.012* 
    (0.007)   (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.006) 
Affiliates: 6-20   0.048***   0.050***   0.043***   0.044*** 
    (0.014)   (0.015)   (0.013)   (0.014) 
Affiliates: 21-50   0.085*   0.092**   0.070*   0.071* 
    (0.041)   (0.041)   (0.038)   (0.037) 
Affiliates: 51-200   0.107   0.130   0.146   0.205 
    (0.116)   (0.108)   (0.121)   (0.128) 
Industry Diversity   0.043***   0.042***   0.022***   0.017** 
    (0.006)   (0.005)   (0.007)   (0.007) 
                  
Obervations   44,159   44,159   44,159   44,159 
R-Squared   0.036   0.043   0.064   0.1 
Year FE   YES   YES   YES   YES 
Sector FE   NO   YES   YES   YES 
Country FE   NO   NO   YES   YES 
Sector Comp   NO   NO   YES   YES 
CountryXSector FE   NO   NO   NO   YES 
 
Note: The statistical significance is as follows: * significant at 10% ; ** significant at 5%, *** 
significant at 1%. OLS regression on group level. The dependent variable is a dummy 
taking on a value of 1 if the group becomes a multinational in our sample period (and 0 if it 
is never multinational). Avg Subsidiary L (log) is the average log of the number of 
employees of the subsidiary in a group, Avg Subsidiary _K/L (log) is the average log of the 
capital intensity of the subsidiary in a group, Avg Subsidiary_Sales (log); is the average 
log of the sales of the subsidiary in a group. Affiliates is the number of   subsidiaries in a 
business group. No. of Layers is the number of Layers of the business group; Industry 
Diversity is an index measuring the diversity of the group based on NACE 4. Standard 
errors are clustered at the Headquarters level. Data are from the Amadeus (Bureau Van 
Dijk) dataset, 2001-2007. The subsample considered is the one described in Table 1. 
However, only two types of business groups are considered—those that become 
multinational and those that were never multinational (groups always having a 
multinational status in the study period are dropped). 
 
5 The First Foreign Acquisition 
 
We now examine how a group becomes multinational—what the first 
acquired subsidiary of these switching groups looks like. We analyse how the 
first foreign subsidiary compares to the existing domestic subsidiaries: (i) 
geographically—whether it is close or distant from the domestic group’s 
country; (ii) the layer at which it enters within the hierarchy of the group; and 
(iii) the industry in which it performs its activity. By so doing, we hope to shed 
light on some of the reasons that a business group might choose to go 
multinational.  
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 Table 15 reports how domestic groups become multinational. More 
specifically, it shows where these groups chose to acquire their first 
subsidiaries. Note that the distribution of switchers across countries mirrors 
the distribution of groups, as seen in Table 2. Countries with more groups 
tend to have a larger number of switchers. This is expected, and it ensures 
that the country composition in previous sections will be reflected in the 
present analysis.   
As reported in Table 15, many business groups acquire their first 
subsidiary in neighbouring regions or in regions that are legally and culturally 
similar to their own. This is in line with standard gravity model results in the 
trade literature. Business groups in Spain, for example, acquire subsidiaries 
mostly in Portugal, which aligns with the idea of acquiring firms in close 
geographic proximity. Similarly, French groups enter Belgium (both culturally 
close and neighbouring), Spain (bordering country) and countries 
characterized by rich and large markets, such as Germany, the UK and Italy 
(with which it also retains some historical ties). Many of these groups also 
acquire their first subsidiary in Germany. This comes as no surprise given the 
large market and hub for industrial production that Germany offers. We also 
observe that business groups in a large number of countries enter the 
Netherlands, also perhaps due to its proximity to Germany and its sea 
access to the Nordic countries.  
 
Table 15. Probability of Becoming a Multinational Group 
 
Note: The table shows domestic groups that make their first foreign acquisition (switchers) in 
the time period studied (2001-2007). To maintain consistency with the rest of the tables in 
terms of countries represented, we report only switching groups (742 observations) 
AT BE CH CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR IT NL NO PL PT RO SE
Austia AT 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7
Belgium BE 1 0 0 1 12 3 0 2 0 29 5 3 2 17 1 3 0 1 0 80
Germany DE 18 0 5 1 0 3 0 5 0 3 24 0 0 15 0 9 0 0 0 83
Spain ES 1 1 1 6 18 2 1 0 0 33 24 1 18 8 0 0 3 3 1 121
Finland FI 1 0 0 0 9 5 39 0 0 1 9 0 0 1 11 2 0 0 1 79
France FR 1 25 3 0 45 1 0 4 1 0 52 0 13 9 2 4 3 4 0 167
Italy IT 4 3 1 0 21 0 0 11 0 14 26 3 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 86
NetherlandsNL 1 2 1 0 9 0 0 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 21
Portugal PT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 6
Sweden SE 0 1 0 0 5 17 7 2 8 2 14 0 2 2 29 2 1 0 0 92
Total BGs 27 32 11 8 125 31 47 30 9 83 158 7 35 53 43 23 8 8 4 742
Total 
BGs
Switching BG's Country of first move
Subsidiary's Country of First MoveBG HQ's 
Nationality
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belonging to those 20 countries that had the highest concentration of business groups in our 
original sample (as reflected in Table 2). BG HQ’s Nationality is the ultimate holder’s 
nationality, while Subsidiary’s Country of First Move reflects the foreign country into which 
the business group first decided to expand. Data are from the Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk) 
dataset. 
 
The group’s decision to become multinational can be made at various 
levels within the group: the acquisition could be done by the headquarters or 
by one of the close subsidiaries; a decision at the top level could imply a 
“corporate-level decision”; or a decision by a different subsidiary could 
represent an independent move with respect to the rest of the group. In the 
latter case, the acquisition would also change the group structure, making it 
more hierarchical by increasing the number of layers. 
Table 16 reports the tabulation of the mode of the level in the domestic 
part of the group and the mode of the level of the entrant that makes the 
group multinational (we use the mode since, in a few cases, there are more 
than one new foreign subsidiaries). As the table reflects, becoming a 
multinational group appears to be mainly a centralized decision by the 
headquarters or one of its close subsidiaries. The mode of the entrant 
making the group multinational is at a higher level than the mode of the layer 
of domestic subsidiaries. There are 583 groups for which the mode of the 
layer of subsidiaries belonging to the group is level 1. In 344 of these cases, 
the mode of the foreign subsidiary that first makes the group multinational 
also comes in at level 1, at the top—that is, directly under the headquarters. 
However, in 228 of the cases, the subsidiaries that make the group 
multinational come in on level 2. The large number of observations on the 
main diagonal, which identifies groups whose new foreign subsidiary comes 
in at the typical level of existing domestic subsidiaries, suggests that the 
usual subsidiaries making acquisitions in the group are also responsible for 
the group internationalization. 
 
Table 16. Layer of Entry of 1
st
 acquired subsidiary 
      # of Switching Groups : 
Layer of entry of subsidiary making group Multinational       
La
ye
r 
o
f 
d
o
m
es
ti
c 
su
b
si
d
ia
ri
es
 
o
f 
gr
o
u
p
   1 2 3 4 5 # Switchers 
1 344 228 9 1 1 583 
2 9 43 10 1 1 64 
3 1 0 2 3 0 6 
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4 0 0 1 0 0 1 
  354 271 22 5 2 654 
 
Note: The table reports the mode of the level in the domestic part of the group and the mode 
of the level of the entering subsidiary that makes the group multinational (the mode is used, 
as in few cases, there are more than one new foreign subsidiaries). The sample considered 
are the subsidiaries that made domestic groups multinational during the time period studied  
(2001-2007).  Data used are from the Amadeus (Bureau Van Dijk) dataset. 
 
Differences in terms of layer of entry could also be related to some 
characteristics of the group or of the subsidiaries belonging to the group. In 
order to take these elements into account, we run a simple OLS regression 
on an affiliate level, having as our dependent variable the layer of the group 
to which the subsidiary belongs and as our independent variables several 
group and subsidiary characteristics (Table 17). The variable of interest is the 
dummy “New foreign Sub,” which identifies the firm making the group 
multinational. This regression largely confirms what is shown in the Table 16: 
the level of entry of the foreign subsidiary is higher than, but quite close to, 
that of the typical firm in the group. This implies that the decision is made at 
the top, and, therefore, it reflects a “corporate-level decision” that can affect 
the whole group. 
Table 17. Foreign subsidiaries’ level of entry 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES      
      
New foreign Sub 0.327*** 0.334*** 0.321*** 0.221** 0.227** 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.032) (0.079) (0.087) 
avg_lemp 0.006 0.008 -0.005 0.005 -0.005 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.029) (0.031) 
avg_lcap_emp 0.001 0.005 0.005 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) 
avg_lturn -0.019 -0.023 -0.017 -0.041 -0.038 
 (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.030) (0.030) 
Layers_2 0.089*** 0.067** 0.061** 0.123*** 0.122*** 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.025) (0.032) (0.034) 
Layers_3 0.315*** 0.302*** 0.301*** 0.378*** 0.373*** 
 (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.053) (0.053) 
Layers_4 0.705*** 0.686*** 0.680*** 0.746*** 0.762*** 
 (0.086) (0.072) (0.080) (0.141) (0.140) 
Layers_5 0.416* 0.384* 0.391* 0.448* 0.478** 
 (0.223) (0.209) (0.207) (0.222) (0.202) 
Layers_6more 0.371*** 0.358*** 0.383*** 0.351** 0.334** 
 (0.122) (0.117) (0.116) (0.126) (0.140) 
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BG_Size_2_3 0.293*** 0.329*** 0.393*** 0.197 0.265 
 (0.051) (0.057) (0.065) (0.162) (0.177) 
BG_Size_4_5 0.371*** 0.400*** 0.450*** 0.263 0.314* 
 (0.043) (0.040) (0.046) (0.161) (0.179) 
BG_Size_6_20 0.386*** 0.431*** 0.469*** 0.210 0.262 
 (0.055) (0.045) (0.055) (0.154) (0.158) 
BG_Size_21_50 0.613*** 0.653*** 0.674*** 0.299** 0.344** 
 (0.112) (0.141) (0.145) (0.118) (0.123) 
Sector_Div -0.027 -0.027 -0.010 0.047 0.048 
 (0.030) (0.025) (0.030) (0.052) (0.074) 
      
Observations 903 903 903 903 903 
R-squared 0.282 0.311 0.339 0.545 0.574 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Sector FE NO YES YES YES YES 
Country FE NO NO YES YES YES 
CountryXSector FE NO NO NO YES YES 
Sector Composition NO NO NO NO YES 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: OLS regression on a subsidiary level. Dependent variable is the layer of the group to 
which the subsidiary belongs. New foreign Sub identifies the firm making the group 
multinational.  Independent variables are characteristics of subsidiaries (employment, 
capital, sales) and of groups (total number of layers (Layers) and number of subsidiaries 
BG_Size  in a group). Time period studied is 2001-2007; data used come from Amadeus 
(Bureau Van Dijk) dataset. 
 
Finally, we turn to the sector of the subsidiary that makes the group 
multinational. We proceed in two different ways: first, we compare the sector 
of the new firm to the one most common in the group (mode of the sector of 
domestic subsidiaries); then, we compare it to the sector of the ultimate 
owner. Also in this case, the mode of the sector of the entrant is used for the 
cases in which more than one entrant is present. Industry sectors are defined 
at NACE 4. Panel A of Table 18 shows that in two thirds of the cases, the 
sector of the new foreign entrant does not correspond to the sector of the 
classical majority of the group. Panel B of the table shows a comparison 
between the first acquired firm’s sector—i.e., that is, the firm that made the 
group multinational—and the ultimate owner’s sector. The sector of the new 
foreign firm coincides even less frequently with that of the ultimate owner. It 
seems, then, that the new foreign firm does not belong to the characteristic 
domain of activity of the rest of the group. Therefore, our finding suggests 
that the group does not go multinational for the purpose of horizontal FDI, to 
perform local production to access local markets; rather, it goes multinational 
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to diversify its activities with the aim of exploiting other countries’ comparative 
advantage. Our finding is consistent with that of Alforo and Charlton (2009), 
who show that once we get to detailed enough industry codes (4-digits), 
much of the FDI proves to be vertical. 
 
Table 18. Industry of Entry of 1
st
 acquired subsidiary 
  Panel A 
Group  Sector  
 ( subsidiary mode) 
  
Panel B  
Ultimate Holder's Sector 
  
  
  # Switchers   Percentage   # Switchers   Percentage 
Different Sector 419   64%   514   79% 
Same Sector 235   36%   140   21% 
Total # of 
Switchers 654       654     
 
 The findings presented in this section offer evidence about why a 
group goes multinational. The data suggest that a multinational expansion of 
a group is a rather centralized process, initiated by the ultimate owner itself 
or by one of the closest subsidiaries (layer 1), which means that it is a 
“corporate-level decision.” This comes as no surprise, as the important 
strategic decision to expand into a different country probably has to take into 
account the group structure and characteristics. However, the expansion 
seems to also further diversify the group in terms of economic activity: the 
first foreign subsidiary is usually from a different sector than the major part of 
the group and from a different sector than that of its ultimate owner. This 
suggests that group multinational expansion might be driven by the desire to 
acquire particular inputs from a foreign country or to make use of a country’s 
comparative advantage. 
 
6  Conclusion  
An extensive literature provides evidence on the advantages of 
affiliate performance when belonging to business groups (BGs), as opposed 
to being standalones, as well as the benefits of multinational enterprises over 
domestic firms. However, no attempt had been made so far to connect these 
two streams of the literature and to analyse business groups from a 
multinational/domestic perspective. This paper aims to bridge the two 
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different literatures by exploiting the Amadeus dataset, together with the 
business group information from the dataset of Bena, Fons-Rosen and 
Hanousek (2009). We look at sales performance of firms that belong to a 
multinational business group and analyse possible drivers that increase the 
likelihood of becoming a multinational group. We then look at how the 
acquisition of multinational status affects the group structure and activities by 
focusing on the first foreign subsidiary acquired. 
Multinational groups appear to differ substantially from domestic 
groups: they are usually larger and more hierarchical in terms of group 
structure; and their subsidiaries also appear to be superior to subsidiaries of 
domestic groups in terms of both size and sales performance. More 
specifically, we find that firms belonging to multinational groups have 15% 
higher sales after accounting for differences in observables at the group and 
firm levels.  
Transition to multinational status is related to group characteristics. 
Groups that are larger (with more affiliates) and more hierarchical (having 
many layers in the group), and those that have higher sectoral diversity 
(industry mix of the affiliates) are more likely to become multinational. This 
suggest that there is a strong selection into becoming a multinational. 
The transition to multinational status appears to be a rather centralized 
decision. The foreign subsidiary is, in most of cases, acquired by the ultimate 
owner itself or by a subsidiary directly controlled by it. This implies that the 
decision does not have substantial effects on the business group structure. 
However, foreign subsidiaries appear to differ from the group with respect to 
their main economic activity: only in a minority of cases does the sector of the 
first foreign subsidiary coincide with the sector of domestic subsidiaries or 
with that of the headquarters. This provides some preliminary evidence that 
the decision to acquire a foreign subsidiary might be driven by the group’s 
desire to expand its set of activities, possibly gaining access to valuable 
inputs to exploit a country’s relative advantage in some sector. 
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